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ABSTRACT: We model cartel defection in markets with stochastic de-
mand ﬂuctuations as an investment timing problem. We show that (i) the
optimal timing of cartel defection is pro-cyclical, suggesting higher proba-
bility of competitive pricing during booms; and (ii) the defection trigger is
a positive function of demand variability, and larger than its deterministic
demand counterpart, implying that market volatility facilitates collusion.
The ﬁrst result is consistent with the counter-cyclical pricing prediction
originally due to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), but not dependant on
lack of persistence in demand ﬂuctuations. The analysis reveals insights on
implications of co-variation between volatility and demand shocks.
JEL Classiﬁcation numbers: G13, L13
KEYWORDS: cartel defections, volatility, real options
1. Introduction
1.1. Introductory discussion
How does market volatility aﬀect collusive behaviour and, in par-
ticular, the timing of cartel defections? Theoretical research on collu-
sion in oligopolistic industries where the evolution of market demand
is characterised by unpredictable shocks can be broadly categorised
into two branches. The ﬁrst, originated by Green and Porter (1984),
concentrates on the eﬀect of imperfect monitoring of cartel members’
actions on collusive behaviour, in settings where monitoring and de-
mand variability are inseparable problems. The second assumes per-
fect observability of demand shocks, and concentrates on the cyclical
properties of collusive prices. The central question in this branch has
been whether collusive behaviour involves higher or lower prices in
periods of high and low demand, generally associated with booms and
recessions, respectively. The answer to this question hinges on whether
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cartels become more or less stable, in the sense of maintaining the in-
centive to collude, as demand changes over time.
The seminal contribution to this branch of the literature is Rotem-
berg and Saloner’s (1986) analysis of repeated interaction in markets
where market demand is subject to identically and independently dis-
tributed shocks over time. Their analysis indicates that the temp-
tation to defect (by price undercutting) from a cartel is stronger in
periods of high demand, which are associated with booms. The mo-
tivation is simple. As observed demand approaches an upper bound,
it becomes increasingly likely that future realisations will be lower, as
demand returns to ‘normal’ levels, and hence that the expected cost
of defection in terms of (lost) future collusive proﬁts net of punish-
ment phase proﬁts becomes smaller, relative to the immediate gain
from undercutting the cartel and enjoying temporary monopoly prof-
its. Hence the surprising prediction that, in contrast to Green and
Porter (1984) 1 and ‘conventional wisdom,’2 competitive pricing is
more likely in booms than recessions, if we associate high (low) de-
mand with booms (recessions). Eﬀective collusion may thus require
that the cartel promote price reductions during booms in order to
attenuate the destabilising eﬀect of strong positive demand shocks.
Empirical support for this prediction is signiﬁcant.3 It has been
observed that in certain collusive industries cartels collapse after large
increases in demand. Tirole (1988, p. 250) notes the example of
1With imperfectly observable demand uncertainty, Green and Porter (1984)
show that price-wars occur in low demand periods, implying that collusive pricing
is pro-cyclical.
2The following quote from The Economist (2002), referring to the series of cartel
investigations launched by the European Commission in the late 1990’s and early
2000’s, suggests the existence of diﬀering views of what constitutes conventional
wisdom: “The current attack on cartels comes at a time when the temptation to
strike cosy deals with competitors is stronger than ever, as pricing power remains
weak and excess capacity abounds in the wake of the global economic slowdown.”
3Of course, collusion is not the only theoretic explanation for this result. See
Rotemberg and Woodford (1992), and Chevalier, Kashyap and Rossi (2003), for
surveys and critiques of alternative reasons for counter-cyclical mark-ups.Optimal Timing 3
the market for an antibiotic, in which cartel discipline broke down
after a particularly large Government order.4 Ap o s s i b l em a n i f e s t a -
tion of cartel breakdowns after increases in demand is the occurrence
of price wars during booms, well-known evidence of which includes
Porter (1983), for US railroad pricing, and Bresnahan (1987), for the
US automobile industry. In addition, a number of empirical stud-
ies have documented evidence of counter-cyclical mark-ups in imper-
fectly competitive industries - which can be the result of price wars
during booms. Industry speciﬁc studies include Rotemberg and Sa-
loner (1986), for (real) cement prices, and Chevalier, Kashyap, and
Rossi (2003), for supermarket retail prices. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1992) present cross-sectional evidence for United States industry, and
Fedderke, Kularatne and Mariotti (2004) for a cross-section of South
African manufacturers.
One widely recognised limitation of the counter-cyclical pricing
prediction in the Rotemberg-Saloner study, noted here for subsequent
reference, concerns its reliance on the assumption that demand fol-
lows an identically and independently distributed process. As noted
by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991, p. 90), “a result of the i.i.d.
assumption is that ﬁrms’ expectations on future demand are indepen-
dent of current demand, and one implication of this is that ﬁrms never
expect demand to be stronger tomorrow if it is relatively strong to-
day.” A natural question then, is whether the result holds when strong
shocks aﬀect current expectations of future demand. In recognition of
this limitation, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), Kandori (1991),
and Bagwell and Staiger (1997) build on the Rotemberg-Saloner setup
to accommodate the possibility of persistence in the time-varying de-
mand process. Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) present an alterna-
tive to Rotemberg-Saloner for markets in which demand movements
are deterministic and subject to seasonal ﬂuctuations. In Bagwell and
Staiger (1997) demand alternates stochastically between phases of low
and high growth. In both these studies the Rotemberg-Saloner predic-
tion is reversed - except (in Bagwell-Staiger) for the case of negatively
4See also Scherer and Ross (1990).Optimal Timing 4
correlated demand growth. In Kandori (1991) the Rotemberg-Saloner
result is shown to be robust to serially correlated shocks, provided the
discount factor is either above but close to (n-1)/n, with n being the
number of ﬁrms, or it tends to unity.
1.2. Present paper’s contribution
Absent from all the above theories of collusion in markets subject
to stochastic demand shocks is an explicit treatment of the eﬀect of
the magnitude of market volatility, or the degree of uncertainty that
characterises the market, on cartel behaviour. However, the behav-
iour of at least two of the world’s most prominent cartels, the DeBeers
controlled international diamond cartel and the Organisation of Petro-
leum Exporting Countries (henceforth, OPEC), suggest that volatility
may play an important role in cartel behaviour. Indeed, in both cases,
explicit collusion has been motivated by the desirability of reducing (in
the case of OPEC) or preventing (in the case of DeBeers) volatility.5
The central aim in this paper is the presentation of a simple extension
of the literature on collusion under observable but random demand
shocks which can provide an explicit treatment of the eﬀect of market
volatility on the stability of price ﬁxing cartels. The contribution is
twofold.
First, a simple modiﬁcation of the Rotemberg-Saloner and Bagwell-
Staiger basic setups is shown to produce a simple version of the counter-
cyclical pricing result while allowing for (positive) serial correlation.
In contrast to Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) and partly in line
with Bagwell and Staiger (1997), we allow for persistence while assum-
ing unpredictable changes. We obtain a result which is consistent with
Rotemberg-Saloner in predicting that, under uncertainty, observable
cartel defections are more tempting in periods of high demand than
downturns. In particular, there is a threshold level of demand beyond
which the cartel breaks. This threshold is analytically characterized
5See Kretschmer (1998), on the international diamond cartel, and Plourde and
Watkins (1998), on crude oil prices and OPEC.Optimal Timing 5
as a function of a set of observable parameters, and it gives us a tim-
ing rule for defection. Hence, price-ﬁxing cartels have an incentive
to attenuate the destabilising eﬀect of strong positive demand shocks
through a degree of counter-cyclical pricing.
Second, we analyse the defection timing decision as a simple stop-
ping problem, and propose that the strategic decision problem faced by
collusive ﬁrms contemplating cheating on the cartel in a market faced
by volatile demand be viewed as analogous to the decision of whether
to exercise a non-tradable exchange option. The argument is most
evident in the context of trigger strategies with prohibitively costly
renegotiation. When deciding whether to cheat on a cartel operating
in a volatile market, the oligopolist is deciding whether to exchange
the discounted share of expected collusive proﬁts (a stream of uncer-
tain and non-tradable cash ﬂows) for the temporary monopoly windfall
plus discounted expected non-collusive proﬁts (another stream of un-
certain and non-tradable cash ﬂows). Firms are not, of course, under
an obligation to defect. But they have the opportunity to do so at
any stage in the repeated interaction. The criterion for optimal defec-
tion corresponds to an optimal option exercise (or investment) rule.
This analogy, and associated framing of cartel decisions, permits us
to derive an explicit and intuitive relationship between volatility and
the defection trigger, and quantify the eﬀect of changes in the magni-
tude of market volatility on the temptation to cheat on the cartel by
undercutting the collusive price.
Although anchoring the basic setup in the literature on collusion
in markets subject to stochastic demand shocks, the analytic appara-
tus employed in the present paper draws on (indeed, can be seen as a
simple application of) the continuous-time methods in the investment
timing problems analysed by McDonald and Siegel (1986), Dixit and
Pindyck (1994), Grenadier (1996), and Lambrecht (2004). The re-
mainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The assumptions and setup
are stated in section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis and results,
with all proofs in the appendix. Section 4 concludes.Optimal Timing 6
2. The Model
2.1. Description of the strategic interaction
We model the indeﬁnitely repeated interaction between a ﬁxed
set of n ≥ 2 symmetric ﬁrms with no capacity constraints, constant
marginal costs, and producing a homogenous good. In any decision
period in {1,2,...∞}, ﬁrms play a standard Bertrand game, where
the stage-game action spaces consist of the set of non-negative prices:
∀i ∈ {1,2,...,n},A i =[ 0 ,∞),and each ﬁrm chooses its price without
observing the others’ contemporary choices. (Outputs are chosen to
clear the market.) The ﬁrm charging the lowest price captures the
whole market. If all ﬁrms charge the price p,e a c hﬁrm’s stage-game
payoﬀ per consumer is πi(p) ≡ (p−c)D(p) ,w h e r ec is positive and rep-
resents the constant unit cost, and D(p) is the (identical) consumers’
common demand function, assumed to be diﬀerentiable and decreas-
ing in p. The function πi(p),r e p r e s e n t i n gaﬁrm’s proﬁt per consumer,
is assumed to satisfy the following properties: for p>0,πi(p) has a
unique maximizer, pm,a n ddπi(p)/dp > 0 whenever p<p m.H e n c e
pm is the monopoly price.
It is a standard result that the unique pure-strategy (Bertrand-)
Nash equilibrium of the pricing stage game involves all ﬁrms pricing
at marginal cost. However, it can be shown that this need not be
the case with unbounded monopoly proﬁts, where a continuum of
prices above marginal cost can be supported in symmetric mixed Nash
equilibria of the one-shot Bertrand game.6 We assume that the stage
game equilibrium involves all ﬁrms choosing a price which may be
marginally higher than marginal cost, and henceforth refer to this
as the “competitive” price.7 Over time, past and current demand
6See Baye and Morgan (1999) and Klemperer (2003).
7This choice may seem somewhat arbitrary but the analysis is equally applicable
in the more familiar case of marginal cost pricing as the unique Nash equilibrium
of the pricing stage game. Allowing for a non-collusive price just slightly above
marginal cost reﬂects the idea that some small level of proﬁtm a yb ec o n s i s t e n t
with non-collusive price competition in real world oligopoly.Optimal Timing 7
levels as well as rivals’ past prices are perfectly observable, so dynamic
strategies can be conditional on price histories.
Following Rotemberg-Saloner and Bagwell-Staiger, we model the
possibility of collusive pricing through symmetric history-dependent
Nash-reversion trigger strategies, where one ﬁrm’s deviation from the
collusive price triggers the oligopoly’s subsequent reversion to compet-
itive pricing, the simplest collusion inducing mechanism. When a ﬁrm
under-cuts the collusive price, it is able to capture the whole market
for a limited period by incurring a cost m where 0,<m<∞ ,b e f o r e
rivals retaliate.8 The possibility of renegotiation following defection
is not precluded but it is assumed to be “prohibitively costly”, in the
sense that the “innocent” ﬁrms will be unwilling to renegotiate, so that
the possibility of renegotiation does not impede the sustainability of
collusion through simple Nash-reversion trigger strategies.9
Future payoﬀs are discounted at a common constant rate, denoted
by r,w i t hr ∈ (0,1) and r>α>0. If we ignore demand variability,
collusion is strategically sustainable if the present value of temporary
monopoly proﬁts plus subsequent competitive pricing does not exceed
the present value of collusive proﬁts.
2.2. Evolution of demand shocks
We equate the continuously evolving level of market demand, at t ∈
[0,∞), with the contemporary mass of consumers which we denote xt .
The evolution of xt is described by the following stochastic diﬀerential
equation:
dxt = αxtdt + σxtdWt (1)
where dWt is an increment of a standard Wiener process. The con-
stants α and σ can be interpreted, respectively, as the instantaneous
8Alternatively, the parameter m could be interpreted as a monitoring cost which
has to be incurred to ensure that market demand and/or rivals’ prices are perfectly
observable.
9See McCutcheon (1997).Optimal Timing 8
conditional expected percentage change in xt , and the instantaneous
conditional standard deviation, per unit time. Intuitively, demand
grows at a constant long-term rate, and its evolution is constantly
perturbed by a random shock. The size of the parameter σ reﬂects
the magnitude of demand oscillations. Note a well known property
of the geometric Brownian motion described by (1), with reference
to the introductory discussion: it exhibits positive persistence - not
in the sense that a rise in today’s demand signals a further increase
tomorrow, which is always uncertain, but in the weaker sense that the
cumulative probability distribution of future realisations of demand
shifts uniformly to the right when current demand increases. Hence,
the model captures the idea that demand as well as expectations of
future demand, change over time.
3. Analysis
3.1. Analysis and results
We start by characterising the payoﬀs which determine the central
trade-oﬀ between collusion and defection. At any point in time, say
zero, the discounted expected value of 1/n of the stream of collusive











where πi (pm)=( pm − c)D(pm), and the expectation is conditional
on the observed current level of demand. Noting ﬁrst, that the as-
sumed evolution of demand shocks implies that for any t>0 we have
E (xt | x0)=x0eαt , and second, that the properties assumed to be
satisﬁed by π(p) imply that pm, the monopoly (and fully collusive)
price, is invariant to changes in the mass of consumers in the market,Optimal Timing 9







Let τ denote the duration of the period between defection and re-
taliation, so the case of immediate retaliation corresponds to τ =0 .
(Notice that the evolution of all ﬂow variables between decision dates
is continuous.) During the period between t =0and t = τ the defec-
tor earns a defection rent, corresponding to the monopolist proﬁt. At
t = τ the rivals retaliate and the cartel breaks down, with consequent
competitive pricing. Since renegotiation costs are prohibitive, renego-
tiation does not occur and retaliation is followed by an inﬁnite stream
of competitive proﬁts. We emphasise that what the level of demand
will be at any moment subsequent to defection is not known when
the decision to defect is made. Hence, the discounted expected gain
from defection is determined by the discounted sum of two uncertain




















where πi(pc)=( pc − c)D(pc).Using elementary results from sto-













10To verify the invariance of the fully collusive (monopoly) price to changes in
consumer mass (or demand shocks), ﬁxt h el e v e lo fd e m a n da ta na r b i t r a r yl e v e l
X1.B yd e ﬁnition, the monopolist’s proﬁta tp r i c epm will be πm (pm)X1.Suppose
demand changes to X2 where X2 i sp o s i t i v eb u tc a nb el a r g e ro rs m a l l e rt h a nX1,
and the monopolist responds by reducing the price to p2 where p2 <p m .S i n c e
πi(p) is increasing in p for any p below pm, p2 <p m if and only if πm(p2) <π m(pm)
and therefore πm(p2)X2 <π m(pm)X2 , which contradicts proﬁt maximisation.
(The uniqueness of pm obviates the case where the monopolist responds to the
change in demand by raising the price.)
11See Bjork (1998).Optimal Timing 10
The incremental gain from defection, in expected present value
terms, is given by V − K . It is obtained by subtracting (3) from (5)
















− 1/n,and η =1 /n (7)
The following familiar result follows directly from (6).
Proposition 1 Defection is never optimal (the incentive constraint






Basically, a minimum retaliation lag during which the “cheater”
receives monopoly proﬁts is necessary for defection to be potentially
attractive. Proposition 1 simply tells us exactly how long that period
must be, as a function of the number of ﬁrms and the rates of discount
and expected growth in demand. Our interest is in the analysis of the
eﬀect of unpredictable demand ﬂuctuations on the incentive to cheat
on a collusive agreement, and the cartel’s response to this eﬀect, and
particularly, a characterisation of optimal defection timing. Hence we
restrict attention to the case where τ ≥ τ, in which defections may be
optimal depending on the level of demand. The following result is now
evident.
Proposition 2 For τ ≥ τ the relative strength of the incentive to
deviate from collusive pricing is strictly increasing in the current level
of demand.
Intuitively, this result suggests that boom periods with associated
high demand reduce the attractiveness of collusion. Hence, in the ab-
sence of cartel behaviour involving a degree of counter-cyclical pricing
to attenuate the pro-cyclical incentive to defect, price wars may fol-
low large increases in demand. Provided the negation of the conditionOptimal Timing 11
in Proposition 1 is satisﬁed, the cartel is increasingly fragile as de-
m a n dr i s e s .T h e r ew i l lb ear a n g eo fv a l u e so fd e m a n dw i t h i nw h i c h
the incentive to defect is insuﬃciently strong to trigger defection. Be-
yond this collusive range, which represents the continuation region in
the implicit optimal stopping problem, the cartel breaks. Collusion can
only be sustained provided demand does not reach a threshold level, x∗,
which will trigger defection.12 Moreover, note that the optimal stop-
ping rule in this problem is identical to an optimal exercise rule for the
analogous (non-tradable) option to exchange one (non-tradable) risky
asset for another. This intuition is formally summarised through the
characterisation of the threshold x∗, and associated timing rule.
Proposition 3 The timing of cartel defections in markets charac-
terised by stochastic demand ﬂuctuations is pro-cyclical - defection
becomes optimal at the ﬁrst moment that the demand process hits the
threshold x∗from below:
t
∗ =i n f{t ≥ 0:xt ≥ x
∗}









(πi (pm)γ + πi(pc)η)
and β is an explicit function of r, α and σ.
It is worth noting that the derivation of this threshold is consistent
with the belief that the threshold will be hit at some point (see the
appendix). The explicit dependence of the threshold on the volatility
parameter σ is of particular interest. It leads to the results collected
in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 (i)The threshold x∗ is increasing in σ ; (ii) with im-
mediate retaliation and positive σ , the defection threshold consistent
12The result in Proposition 2 and persistence in (1) ensure uniqueness of x∗Optimal Timing 12
with optimal timing of defection always exceeds the trigger implied by
the “defect as soon as the discounted expected beneﬁte x c e e d st h ed i s -
counted expected loss” rule; (iii) the diﬀerence between this trigger
and the derived threshold x∗ is increasing in the level of the volatility
parameter σ .
3.2. Discussion of the eﬀect of volatility
Intuitively, when a ﬁrm defects it faces the possibility that de-
mand will subsequently fall, and post-retaliation non-collusive prices
plus short-term gains prior to retaliation will not compensate for the
lost, and also uncertain, collusive income stream. This point implies
a fundamental distinction between optimal defection rules under de-
terministic and stochastic market demand environments. In the ﬁrst
environment, there is no possibility of “regret”. In the latter, constant
uncertainty about future demand implies an opportunity cost to de-
fection. Our analysis shows that this cost imposes a wedge between
expected gains from defection and expected gains from collusion, such
that equality between these two quantities does not delineate the col-
lusive and competitive regimes. It is clear from the proof of part (ii) of
Proposition 4 (see the appendix) that in environments of uncertain de-
mand, the expected payoﬀ from defection has to exceed the expected
gain from collusion by a strictly positive amount.
Most interestingly, this diﬀerence, which as we show is not cap-
tured by the decision rule commonly used to operationalize the idea
of sequential rationality in models of collusion, is increasing in the
magnitude of volatility. As volatility (or uncertainty) increases, β de-
creases, so β/(β − 1) increases, and the diﬀerence between x∗ and
the “defect as soon as the discounted expected beneﬁte x c e e d st h e
discounted expected loss” trigger becomes wider. The implied predic-
tion is that the greater the degree of uncertainty that characterises
an industry, the easier it will be to sustain collusive agreements - and
consequently the less informative (or ‘reliable’, in terms of predictive
power) any trigger not capturing this eﬀect will be.Optimal Timing 13
Notice that since changes in volatility cause changes in the de-
mand threshold in the same direction, a strong positive demand shock
which is concurrent with an increase in volatility may well have no
impact on the incentive to cheat. The combined eﬀect of demand and
volatility changes can be an increased, decreased, or unaﬀected temp-
tation to defect, depending on the relative strengths of these eﬀects.
In brief: increases in demand uncertainty absorb at least part of the
destabilising eﬀect of large increases in demand.
Lastly notice that x∗ is increasing in α and decreasing in r.T h e
ﬁrst eﬀect is due to β being decreasing in α .I n t u i t i v e l y ,i tr e ﬂects the
larger impact that higher long-term growth has on inﬁnitely earned
collusive proﬁts than it has on short-term monopoly rents. The sec-
ond eﬀect is due to β being increasing in r, and it is consistent with
standard results. It captures the eﬀect of patience on the facility of
collusion.
3.3. Varying the collusive price
It is tempting to conjecture that the cartel may attempt to prevent
defections and ensure collusion across all demand states by reducing
the collusive price as demand passes the threshold. Suppose for exam-
ple that the collusive price is adjusted so as to keep industry proﬁts
constant and prevent increases in the incremental gain from defec-
tion, as demand rises past the threshold.13 To be more precise, let
π∗ ≡ (x∗ − ς)(pm − c)D(pm)where ς is an arbitrarily small constant,
denote industry proﬁt at the monopoly price when market demand is
marginally below the threshold, and let G be an increasing real valued
price adjustment function satisfying the following properties:
No 1
G(xt) ≤ 0 when xt <x




m − G(xt) − c)D(p
m − G(xt)) = π
∗when xt ≥ x
∗
13I am thankful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.Optimal Timing 14
The ﬁrst property is easily satisﬁed by monotonic transformations
of the incremental gain from defection. The second property simply
ensures that price adjustments made to mitigate the temptation to
cheat are consistent with maximisation of collusive proﬁts in the fol-
lowing collusive pricing scheme:
p
v (xt)=m a x[ p
m − max(G(xt),0),p
c] (8)
Thus, if demand is below the threshold we have that G(xt) ≤ 0
and pv = pm, so that the collusive price corresponds to the monopoly
price. Once demand breaks through the threshold we have that by
construction G(xt) > 0 and the collusive price moves to the interval
[pc,p m] , between the perfectly competitive and monopoly prices. The
further demand moves past the threshold, the closer the collusive price
will have to be to the competitive price.
Letting (pc − c)D(pc)=0the trade-oﬀ between payoﬀsf r o md e -
fection and continued collusion is now the same at all levels of demand
above the threshold, since the payoﬀ stream from collusion is a frac-
tion 1/n of an indeﬁnitely earned constant ﬂow, while the payoﬀ from
defection consists of n times this constant stream earned between de-
fection and retaliation. (For simplicity we ignore the possibility that
between defection and retaliation demand does not stay above the
threshold.) The incentive constraint for continued collusion then as-
sumes the standard textbook form, namely e−rt ≥ (n − 1)/n. Recall
that under the simpler scheme with a non-varying collusive price (at
the demand invariant monopoly price), we have from a re-statement
of Proposition 1 that the incentive constraint is satisﬁed for any level
of demand provided e−(r−a)τ ≥ (n − 1)/n. From r>α≥ 0 it follows
that collusion across all states is feasible under the varying collusive
price and ﬁxed proﬁts scheme only when it is also feasible with the
non-varying collusive price and variable proﬁts scheme.Optimal Timing 15
4. Conclusion
This paper presented an analysis of optimal cartel defection tim-
ing, where members of the cartel are price-setting Bertrand competi-
t o r sa n dt h ee v o l u t i o no fd e m a n ds h o c k si sr e p r e s e n t e db yB r o w n i a n
motion. The results reveal that increases (respectively, decreases) in
demand variability increase (decrease) the threshold level of demand
which separates the collusion and defection regions. Hence, volatility
serves as a hitherto unidentiﬁed collusion facilitating factor.
Moreover, it was shown that the temptation to cheat on a price-
manipulating agreement is monotonically increasing in the level of
demand, so the timing of cartel defection is pro-cyclical. Given our
restriction of the analysis to the case where defections may occur de-
pending on the observed state of demand, this result implies the possi-
bility of price wars in periods of particularly high demand. Speciﬁcally,
the fully collusive price corresponds to the monopoly price for levels of
demand below the derived threshold, and falls discontinuously to the
competitive price once demand hits this threshold. Although a more
detailed exploration of collusive pricing could be a valuable exten-
sion of our analysis, this prediction is consistent with the interesting
results in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), and suggests that the cru-
cial assumption behind the theoretic possibility of price wars during
booms is the unpredictability of future demand and not, as previously
contended in the theoretic literature, the lack of persistence in the
e v o l u t i o no fd e m a n ds h o c k s .
Combining the eﬀects of demand ﬂuctuations and volatility in the
analysis of collusion suggests that to determine whether collusive pric-
ing is pro- or counter-cyclical in industries faced by volatile demand, it
is necessary to isolate the eﬀect of changes in volatility. If, for example,
there is a tendency for changes in demand to be positively associated
with changes in volatility, decreases in demand would be accompa-
nied by decreases in the defection threshold. Hence we could observe
price wars in periods of low demand, despite the positive relationship
between levels of demand and the incentive to defect.Optimal Timing 16
Unfortunately, the existing empirical literature on price wars and
collusive pricing over the business cycle alluded to in the introduction
cannot be used to test our predictions at this stage, since the eﬀects in
the preceding paragraph cannot be disentangled. It would be instruc-
tive to re-examine the evidence to determine whether volatility plays
as i g n i ﬁcant role in explaining the reported diﬀerences in observed
behaviour and pricing patterns across industries. Another direction
for further work, currently being pursued by the author, is to extend
the analysis to the case of an output-ﬁxing cartel, and confront the
adapted model’s predictions with the behaviour of members of the
OPEC cartel, and the evolution of oil prices.
5. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 This follows immediately by noting that by
assumption: (i)n,m,(r − α), and monopoly proﬁts are strictly
positive; and (iii) πi (pc)η ≈ 0.It follows that (6) will be strictly
negative at all demand states if:
(1 − e
−(r−α)τ) < (1/n) (9)
Re-arranging and taking logs gives the result.¥
Proof of Proposition 2 The result follows directly from (6) and














r−α (πi (pm)γ + πi (pc)η) >
x
r−α (πi (pm)γ + πi (pc)η)¥Optimal Timing 17
Proof of Proposition 3 First note that the claimed pro-cyclicality
of defection timing is a direct consequence of Proposition 2,
where we show that the incremental gain from defection is in-
creasing in x. Hence collusion is sustainable for x between zero
and a positive threshold x∗. It follows that defection becomes
optimal once xt hits the threshold x∗ from below. Second, the
uniqueness of x∗ is ensured by the result in Proposition 2 (incre-
mental gain increases monotonically with x) and the persistence
in the dynamic evolution of xt.14 Let F(xt) denote the value of
the hypothetical option to defect, assumed to be a twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable function of xt. In the continuation (i.e.
collusive) region the Bellman equation can be written as:
rF (xt)=E (dF (xt)) (11)




















− rF =0 (13)




This solution is applicable over the range of prices for which it
is optimal to collude - or not to defect. The Threshold can be
14See the appendix to chapter 4 of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a particularly
relevant discussion of optimal stopping.Optimal Timing 18
obtained from the procedure for the valuation of the implicit
option F. This is done by imposing two boundary conditions
on (13). First, that the payoﬀ from defection goes to zero as
demand goes to aero: F(xt) −→ 0 as xt −→ 0; second, a value
matching condition specifying the payoﬀ from defection (option
exercise) when the timing of defection is optimal. Expression (6)
gives the surplus from defecting. The value-matching condition













It can be shown that this implies that the expected discounted
value of the surplus gained if defection occurs when threshold


















where β is an explicit function of r,α,and σ (in particular, it is
the positive root of the quadratic 1
2σ2ξ (1 − ξ)+αξ−r =0 ) ,and
the factor (xt/x∗)
β can be interpreted as the probability with
w h i c ht h el e v e lo fd e m a n dh i t st h et h r e s h o l dx∗,conditional on
the current level of deman, xt.15
The defection threshold x∗ can now be obtained from the (nec-










(πi (pm)γ + πi (pc)η)
¥
15See Grenadier (1996) and Lambrecht (2004)Optimal Timing 19
Proof of proposition 4 Part (i). Standard - It follows from the
facts that ∂β/∂σ < 0 and ∂ (β/(β − 1))/∂σ > 0. (See Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994).
Part (ii). With immediate retaliation (τ =0 )we have from (6):
γ =( 1 /n) and (as before) η =1 /n (17)
The ‘defect as soon as discounted expected beneﬁts exceed dis-
counted expected costs’ rule is satisﬁed for values of x such that











and the associated trigger, or cut-oﬀ level of demand, denoted




πi (pc) − πi (pm)
(19)

























Part (iii). This follows from part (i) and the non-dependence of
x∗∗ on σ.¥Optimal Timing 20
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